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Abstract
The research in this paper seeks to analyze the rhetoric surrounding issues
of American foreign policy using the Iran Deal as a case study. The main question
this research intends to answer is: Are suggested soft power policy solutions, such
as that of the Iran Deal, characterized as either feminine or masculine? I seek to
answer this question through a discourse analysis of the rhetoric in newspaper
articles from The New York Times and The Washington Post about the Iran Deal
from the year 2015. I identify common themes and phrases among these articles
and draw my own conclusions about their frequency and relationship. Ultimately,
I find that soft power policy solutions are characterized through the use of both
feminine and masculine language depending on whether or not the owner of the
rhetoric is supportive or unsupportive of the policy. This research begs the
question of whether or not feminine language is used to render a soft power policy
solution as inherently less legitimate than hard power policy solutions.
Implications regarding soft power policies, women and heterosexual men in the
field of foreign policy, and the difference in value given to masculinity and
femininity will be discussed.
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Introduction
In 2016, 42 percent of voting-age Americans stated that the nation was
becoming “too soft and feminine,” (Beinart 2016). In that same year, we saw the
first nomination of a female candidate by a major party for President of the United
States. Those who responded they “completely agree” that America is becoming
“too soft and feminine,” were four times as likely to respond that they had a “very
unfavorable” view of Hillary Clinton compared to those who chose that they
“completely disagree” (Beinart 2016). Current research tells us that female
leaders are “less likely” to be perceived as legitimate in their positions than their
male peers, and that “subordination to women” is the number one type of
emasculation men fear the most (Beinart 2016). As Secretary of State, Clinton
began working on the Iran nuclear deal in 2011 (Landler 2016). Her role in the
deal was what she characterized as, ““set[ting] the table” for Mr. [John] Kerry’s,”
ultimate diplomatic success (Landler 2016). Clinton’s role in the creation of the
deal is nuanced, though. She worked closely along side other members of the
United Nations to pressure Iran into engaging with the negotiations, something
that led to the continued existence of the agreement (Landler 2016). However, as
a rather hawkish politician, Secretary Clinton did not come out of the gate fully
supporting the Iran deal, nor did she completely agree with the path that President
Obama and then-Senator John Kerry were pushing (Landler 2016). She didn’t
trust Iran and, though she created a diplomatic team throughout a long negotiation
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process and expected to implement the plan with full force, Secretary Clinton
really saw the deal as a way to catch Iran in a fatal blunder (Landler 2016).
Clinton consistently emphasized the importance of enforcement, setting her apart
from President Obama’s response to the nuclear deal in its final stages.
The Iran nuclear deal has become a defining debate of American foreign
policy. Ultimately, the goal of the agreement is to decrease Iran’s nuclear
capabilities in exchange for the lifting of international economic sanctions. The
agreement has stripped Iran of almost all of its enriched uranium and has given
significant power to the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct
inspections at a much higher frequency (Szubin 2017). Critics of the agreement
believe that it will have no effect on the nuclear capabilities of Iran. They see the
deal as having no mechanism for proper accountability—that just the threat of the
replacement of economic sanctions will not be enough for Iran to actually stop
constructing a nuclear armament. Many critics are concerned that Iran will not
only be able to continue its nuclear program without the knowledge of the U.S. or
the IAEA, but also that increased economic stability will only give the state more
regional power and prompt Iran to give increased funding to terrorist
organizations (Szubin 2017). Though it will be discussed in greater detail later in
the paper, this is where we see language characterizing the deal as “volatile,”
“dependent,” and “powerless.” Supporters of the deal largely see the agreement as
a better alternative to the use of total military force, even though many agree that
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the deal is not perfect. Some supporters believe that the agreement should not
have an end date, should cover a wider range of weapons, and should give more
power to inspection agencies (Davenport 2018). The rhetoric seen coming from
those who support the deal does recognize the agreement’s potentially flawed
nature, but they also characterize the agreement as “responsible” and “civilized.”
The deal has been hotly contested in Congress, and continues to be a source of
major debate even though the IAEA has reported that, to-date, Iran has been
compliant with the guidelines of the agreement (Davenport 2018).
Hillary Clinton’s relationship with the Iran nuclear deal is an interesting
introduction to the rhetoric surrounding the agreement. The language we use
matters. If our politicians and journalists are using language associated with
femininity to purposefully delegitimize an action of foreign policy that doesn’t
involve hard power—a concept that will be discussed shortly—then their words
are having an effect on the women in our society whether they intend for them to
or not. Though the academic community has accepted that femininity and
masculinity do not correlate directly to femaleness and maleness, to the average
person, femininity does equal femaleness. Thus, the continued use of feminine
language to signify inferiority only further solidifies the assumption that women
themselves are inferior to men, especially within the field of foreign policy.
American foreign policy has a masculinity problem. The ideology of
masculinity is so engrained into the culture of our political system that anything
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that does not align with the language of strength and dominance is seen as
illegitimate. This limits our foreign policy options at the outset because certain
options are already mobilized off of the agenda, while aggressive and military
solutions are given prominence. This can be seen in the preeminence of military
service as a prerequisite for foreign policy expertise (Enloe 2005). Moreover, the
language we use to discuss foreign policy reflects this view. We almost
exclusively view foreign policy and national security through a masculine lens, in
which the United States must come out as the dominant player above all others.
Dominance places an emphasis on physical power and supremacy, and more
specifically involves the emasculation of others (Coe et al. 2007). Emasculation is
a significant concept, particularly in the discussion of the rhetoric of foreign
policy. The U.S.’s emasculation of their political adversaries not only involves the
stripping of traditionally masculine qualities, such as courage and nobility, but it
also involves attributing to them typically feminine qualities, such as weakness or
lack of emotional control (Coe et al. 2007). It is not just that the United States
seeks to be the most dominant player in any political relationship, but that the
U.S. seeks to be the most masculine.
Carol Cohn (1993) argues, “…gender discourse informs and shapes
nuclear and national security discourse, and in so doing creates silences and
absences…it degrades our ability to think well and fully about nuclear weapons
and national security, and shapes and limits the possible outcomes of our
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deliberations,” (emphasis not my own). My project intentionally takes up these
silences and absences to explore how American foreign policy is shaped and
limited. The findings of this research add to a growing interest in issues of gender
in American foreign policy, and aims to add nuance to this wider body of
literature. It also hopes to spark a greater conversation about the gendered
hierarchy of values I’ve traced here and about how those in the discipline can
work to change it. The American affinity to the use of aggression and the ease
with which our foreign policy makers gravitate towards it as the most sensible
solution to a conflict keeps diplomatic responses on the backburner; this
occurrence is demonstrated by the language with which policy solutions are
discussed. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the language that is being used,
and to discuss what the discourse of American foreign policy is currently
ignoring.
Foreign policy solutions are typically categorized in two different
classifications: hard power and soft power (Nye 1990). Without even defining
what hard and soft power actually are, it is easy to discern that hard power
includes the use of the military while soft power involves diplomacy; hard power
is to the Department of Defense as soft power is to the State Department (Nye
1990). The reason most people, regardless of their level of knowledge regarding
foreign policy, would be able to match hard power to the military and soft power
to diplomacy is because the words “hard” and “soft” are descriptive rhetoric that
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create images in our heads. Hard and soft power have been socially constructed to
convey a specific meaning. Social construction occurs when a particular meaning
is attached to a concept as a result of preconceived notions held by general
society; further, these attached meanings create and solidify a reality that their
subject then exists in (Doty 1993). Though this paper will delve even deeper into
the details of masculine and feminine language later on, this is a meaningful
introductory discussion. The word “hard” is associated with strength—strong
substances such as steel, concrete, and muscle are all hard—and thus so is the
military. The word “soft,” however, is associated with weakness—feeble
materials such as cotton and foam are soft—and thus so is diplomacy. When we
categorize words into a gender discourse, the word “hard” falls under masculine
and the word “soft” falls under feminine. We have socially constructed the reality
of hard and soft power, but more importantly we have socially constructed a
gendered reality that these two concepts live in.
The concept of social construction will continue to play an important role
throughout this paper. Using gendered descriptive language to brand the Iran deal
is by definition the social construction of the Iran deal. Because soft power, hard
power, masculinity, and femininity bring along with them their own realities, the
Iran deal assimilates to these realities when this is the language used to discuss it.
The Iran deal is an intangible, gender neutral subject so it can be neither hard nor
soft and neither masculine nor feminine, but because the gendered language of
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hard and soft foreign policy is used to discuss it, it comes to be defined by a
mixture of these descriptors. The stance that a politician or journalist took on the
deal impacted the reality they attempted to create for it. If the speaker did not
support the Iran deal, it came to exist within a framework of feminine language.
Potentially more interestingly, if the speaker did support the agreement, it was
branded almost exclusively via masculine language.
Throughout the history of American foreign policy, our military defense
program has been celebrated and over funded, while the State Department has
consistently fought for its place in the federal government. It is inarguable that
hard power—the use or threat of force—has been exalted far above soft power in
American foreign policy. Historically, we can see one example of this preference
for military power through the way negotiations were characterized as a policy of
appeasement during the interwar period. Even the use of the term itself—
appeasement as opposed to negotiations—placed a stronger emphasis on the
concessions being made than on the goal of reaching peace without violence,
conjuring a more negative connotation of the policy. Realist scholars and political
actors posited appeasement policy as an aversion to an inevitable showing of
military force that was undoubtedly needed to stop Italy and Germany, and was
specifically described as naïve, corrupt, and cowardly (Ripsman and Levy 2008;
Ashworth 2002). Appeasement policy, a soft power policy solution, was
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denigrated in contrast to the use of the military, even during the aftermath of a
war coined “The War to end All Wars.”
Scholars have been studying the relationship between foreign policy and
masculinity for some time, but the research specifically regarding femininity is
lacking. The work these scholars have completed has already established that
masculine rhetoric is used in the discussion of foreign policy to display strength
and power (Coe et al. 2007; Cohn 1993; Dean 1998; Enloe 2005; Ferguson 2007;
Tickner 1992); in this paper I seek to determine whether or not feminine rhetoric
is used to describe policies that do not fit the masculinized institution of American
foreign policy.	
  Previous work has focused largely on the impact of masculine
rhetoric in foreign policy to legitimize particularly aggressive foreign policy
options which typically encompass hard power, but there has been less attention
paid to how less aggressive foreign policy solutions of soft power are feminized.
Both this analysis and previous research show possible implications regarding
whether or not the use of feminine language renders soft power policy solutions
as less legitimate. In this vein, the key contribution of my project is to examine
the rhetoric surrounding the discussion of a specific foreign policy that centralized
the ideas of diplomacy and negotiation, and to analyze the gendered dimensions
of media coverage of this policy option. In order to do this, I perform a discourse
analysis of the Iran Deal during the year of 2015. I observe the rhetoric used by
those discussing the Iran Deal (typically political pundits, journalists, and

	
  

10

politicians) and use these observations to further discuss the gendered
implications of the language chosen. I pursue one main research question
throughout the discourse analysis and discussion thereafter. Are soft power policy
solutions, such as the Iran Deal, gendered feminine through the rhetoric that is
used to discuss them? Furthermore, I find that supporters of a policy solution that
is typically feminized use masculine language as a counter.
It is important to note that the goal of this research is not to implicate
specific foreign policy actors as anti-woman. Furthermore, I also do not
particularly intend to say that there is a conscious effort by politicians and
journalists to equate femaleness with inferiority. As will be discussed later on,
femininity and masculinity are not the same thing as femaleness and maleness.
What I do intend to argue is that the words our society has come to recognize as
masculine—strong, powerful, diligent, trustworthy—are given more credence;
while the words our society has come to recognize as feminine—soft, dependent,
compromise, thoughtful—are codified as “less than” those that convey
masculinity. In her 1988 response to Morgenthau’s six principles of political
realism, Ann Tickner seeks to uncover why international politics is perceived as
“a man’s world,” and why women are so underrepresented within the active and
the academic fields. Before she asks this question, Tickner (1988) states, “Nuclear
strategy, with its vocabulary of power, threat, force, and deterrence, has a
distinctly masculine ring; moreover, women are stereotypically judged to be
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lacking in qualities which these terms evoke.” I quote Tickner in this instance to
show that the questions she and I are posing are not unrelated, but they are still
different questions.
Throughout the rest of this project I will show that soft power policy is
inherently related to femininity. The remainder of my thesis proceeds as follows.
First, I layout my theoretical framework through a discussion of masculinity and
femininity and the relationship between gender and American foreign policy.
Then I discuss my findings from the discourse analysis of the Iran Deal and use
my theoretical framework to show how these concepts are interconnected. Finally,
in my conclusion I gesture to larger questions that arise from my findings.
Ultimately, I find that not only is soft power rhetorically categorized as feminine,
but also that supporters of soft power policy almost exclusively use masculine
language. I question whether or not this masculine rhetoric is used to legitimize a
soft power policy solution as viable and effective. The distinction between these
two types of language—feminine language to delegitimize, masculine language to
legitimize—is important to make because it shows that there is an active
understanding of feminine descriptive language as evoking a sense of inferiority.
Contextualizing the Question
There is a long history between the concepts of gender and American
foreign policy, so the questions I ask here are not unprecedented. In order to give
context to my research questions, I divide my theoretical framework into two
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categories. First is a discussion of masculinity and femininity; what these terms
mean, how they are related, and the common rhetoric prescribed to both. This
discussion allows me to structure and build my theory concerning the rhetoric of
foreign policy, as I find that masculinity and femininity are evoked through
language that is vastly different. I also find that femininity is relegated to a
discourse of weakness and vulnerability, while masculinity encompasses anything
that is strong and powerful. The distinction between this rhetoric is a continuation
of the differences between hard and soft power that have previously been
introduced. A discussion about the relationship between American foreign policy
and gender follows. This discussion in particular gives historical context to the
part of my theory that relies on masculinity already being established as
prominent in American foreign policy. The standard discourse of American
foreign policy is gendered masculine, and this shapes the way society perceives
the best policies to implement and the best leaders for the field. The literature
shows that language gendered masculine has long been used in American foreign
policy to convey a message of strength, dominance, and power in the realm of
international politics in foreign affairs. I intend to use this literature to frame the
questions I am asking and to structure the theoretical discussion that will follow.
Masculinity and Femininity
A tale as old as time; the connotations of the words masculinity and
femininity have been forming from the dawn of society. In today’s rhetorical
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world, masculinity denotes what is “manly,” while femininity conveys the image
of what is considered “womanly,” or rather, whatever the opposite of “manly” is
(Paechter 2006). It is, however, incredibly hard to define what exactly is and is
not “manly,” (Paechter 2006; Connell 1995). One interesting aspect of
masculinity is that it is socially perceived to be something that is earned, whereas
femininity is something one is born with (Gilmore 1990, 1); women are born
while men are made. A person, typically a male, “becomes” masculine through a
process that involves heterosexual sexual conquests and excellence in challenging
situations (Gilmore 1990, 1). More importantly, because masculinity is something
that can and must be earned by males, women are completely excluded from the
narrative. This means that femininity and masculinity are seen as two, mutually
exclusive, separate binaries in competition with one another; it leads us to
perceive that a person—or policy—exhibiting feminine qualities cannot possibly
also exhibit masculine qualities. Until the mid-to late 20th century, academics and
psychologists largely believed that masculinity and femininity were two polar
opposites, and that people could be described as either one or the other (Hoffman
2001). Over time, the academic community has come to accept that masculinity
and femininity exist on a scale, or a spectrum, on which people and characteristics
fall (Hoffman 2001). Still, socially and rhetorically we polarize masculinity and
femininity. The socially constructed connotations of what it means to be either
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masculine or feminine have affected the language and rhetoric we use on a daily
basis.
This concept of social construction continues to be important in the
context of how politicians and journalists discuss the Iran deal because of the
understood meanings that follow masculinity and femininity. We perceive
masculinity and femininity in a certain way because of the societal definitions that
we’ve given to them. The term masculinity is ultimately derived from the Latin
diminutive “mas,” meaning “male person” (Online Etymology Dictionary). As
language evolved, masculinity did not simply become the adjective of mere
maleness, it became the word used to describe “having the appropriate qualities
of the male sex,” (Online Etymology Dictionary, emphasis my own). These
appropriate qualities include strong and powerful, aggressive, brave, competent
and intelligent, independent, assertive, confident, and the ability to dominate, to
use logic, and to reason (Cohn 1993; Dean 1998; Echabe 2010; Fagenson 1990;
Pacholok 2009; Tickner 1992; Drew 2004). Admittedly, it is difficult to discern
which came first: powerful men who pushed the idea of what a man should or
should not be, or society’s construction of such a man?
Men who portray only the ideals of masculinity have historically been
rewarded with success in their pursuit of power in American society. The fervor
with which our society has held on to this idea of what men should act like has led
to what has been coined hegemonic masculinity. Because the men in power
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portray characteristics like strength and dominance, we associate these terms with
what “real” men should act like. Over time, the United States military has used
this idea of hegemonic masculinity to draw on who they most want to be the
members of the armed forces. The military has consistently portrayed its ideal
candidate as an able-bodied male who is both heterosexual and cisgender,
someone they can build into a strong, dominant, patriotic man (Locke 2013). Thus
military masculinity and hegemonic masculinity have become virtually
synonymous with one another, creating a problem when we seek to create soft
power policy solutions—characterized as feminine—in opposition to military
solutions. We also know of course that the terms listed above do not define the
characteristics of all men; or in other words, not all men fit into one classification
of masculinity (Paechter 2006; Hoffman 2001; Lansky 2001). Hegemonic
masculinity in practice devalues not only women, but also men who do not fit into
the idealized version of masculinity. “Masculine gender role training is probably
more rigid than its feminine equivalent…men are confined to a much narrower
range of acceptable gender performances,” (Lansky 2001) and we can see
examples of how this plays out in our society fairly easily. Conservatives heavily
ridiculed President Obama, questioned his authenticity, and called him “pathetic”
and “weak” after he shed tears when discussing the 2012 Sandy Hook School
Shooting (Bobic 2016; Lussenhop 2016). Homosexual men have been
systematically discriminated against throughout the history of the military
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(Sinclair 2009). Up until President Clinton’s 1993 policy of Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell, homosexual men were strictly banned from the United States military, a
policy that presumed that homosexuality inherently rendered someone not
masculine enough—or rather, too feminine—to be capable of serving in the
military (Sinclair 2009). Even the DADT policy assumes that homosexuality,
once known of, has a negative effect on an organization structured on idealized
masculinity (Sinclair 2009).
In the same way there are specific characteristics that we associate with
masculinity, femininity can be defined by our social construction as well. The
words that evoke these characteristics include pleasant, modest, helpless,
dependent, emotional, cooperative, naïve, kind, selfless, serving, affectionate,
understanding, and empathetic (Wilkie 2012; Takacs 2005; Cohn 1993; Tickner
1992; Fagenson 1990; Echabe 2010). Even though research widely accepts that
masculinity and femininity are on a spectrum, society dictates that femininity is
anything that is the opposite of masculinity. What is most important about the
relationship between masculinity and femininity and the rhetoric with which we
elicit their imagery, is the value we place on masculinity above femininity. In
Gendering War Talk, Carol Cohn (1993, 229) argues
“…human characteristics are dichotomized, divided into pairs of polar
opposites that are supposedly mutually exclusive: mind is opposed to
body; culture to nature; thought to feeling; logic to intuition; objectivity to
subjectivity; aggression to passivity; confrontation to accommodation;
abstraction to particularity; public to private; political to personal, ad
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nauseam. In each case, the first term of the “opposites” is associated with
male, the second with female. And in each case, our society values the
first over the second.”
The idea that these characteristics are mutually exclusive to one another is the
foundation of the problem. When a person begins to exhibit one of these traits, the
rest of society automatically positions them on the spectrum of masculinity and
femininity (Cohn 1993). We force people—and policy—into boxes and place
value on the categorization we’ve given them. So if a woman uses emotion, she is
automatically characterized as feminine and is excluded from being able to own
any of the traits we associate with masculinity, and because we inherently
perceive feminine qualities as less valuable than masculine qualities, this creates a
problem for women seeking positions of power. We can see now that using
certain words as descriptors lead to how we categorize a subject subconsciously;
and more specifically, we can see how it impacts the social construction of the
Iran deal. When a male politician posits that his female opponent is “kindhearted” and “well-meaning,” we associate her with feminized language, and even
though he never said that she was “dependent” or “naïve” we assume that she is
anyway. In the same way, when the Iran nuclear deal is characterized as
“vulnerable” or “weak,” it is automatically precluded from being “responsible” or
“smart,” because these descriptors exist on opposite sides of the gender spectrum.
I seek to use the concepts of masculinity and femininity to uncover the
ways in which soft power policy solutions are constructed through the institution
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of gendered rhetoric that foreign policy exists within. The contradictions that
masculine and feminine language bring to life when used to build the rhetoric
surrounding foreign policy solutions serve to characterize such policies as either
valuable or invaluable. The feminine descriptive language discussed above is the
specific type of descriptive rhetoric that I search for in my discourse analysis of
the Iran deal. The Iran deal is consistently characterized as feminine because it is
soft power and thus it is inherently feminized in nature, especially when it is in
direct opposition to hard power solutions that involve military power, which owns
an archetype of strength and dominance.
American Foreign Policy and Gender
In general, there is a difference in the way that foreign policy overall is
gendered in comparison to domestic policy. Foreign policy, because of its
relationship to war, power, conflict, and security and to the language that
inherently follows these concepts, is gendered masculine (Tickner 1988).
Domestic issues, such as health care and education policy, are typically gendered
feminine because they are associated with characteristics such as nurturing
(Tickner 1988). The public—policies that affect the greater good, i.e. foreign
policy—is in opposition to the private—policies that impact citizens more in their
daily lives, i.e. domestic policy. This perception of foreign policy as innately
masculine and domestic policy as feminine means that female voices are
considered unimportant and unreliable (Tickner 1992). This gendering of the two
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types of policy is why it’s been easier for women to enter into the overall field of
public policy work through feminized positions than through masculinized
positions. Currently, there is one woman on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, but ten women on the Committee on Education and the Workforce. It
is important to recognize the way that our perceptions of public policy can have
an effect on the people that we accept as worthy of playing a role in our foreign
affairs.
After the 2002 midterm elections, Bill Clinton famously said, “When
people are feeling insecure, they’d rather have someone who is strong and wrong
than someone who’s weak and right,” (Goldstein 2003). The Bush
administration’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was littered with language
about strength, dominance, and aggression in the face of a challenge (Christensen
2008; Coe et al. 2007; Drew 2004; Ferguson 2007; Goldstein 2003; Takacs 2005).
The Republican party did well in the midterm elections following the 9/11 attack
because their rhetoric expressed what Richard Goldstein (2003) called
“patriarchal values of strength and order,” while the Democratic party talked
about empathy, equity, conciliation, and peace talks—all words that trigger a
feminine image in the minds of their constituents.
The strategic use of gendered language by the Bush administration didn’t
just refer to statements about dominating the Middle East and fighting back
against terrorism. The language used by President Bush signified that America in
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its current state was vulnerable; the United States needed to use military might—a
masculine entity due to its inherent aggressive nature—to “defend its honor,” to
protect the weakest among us—women and children—and become survivors of
our tragic victimization (Drew 2004; Christensen 2008). The United States was
painted as a feminine entity, one that was clearly weak and susceptible to
violation, and the only solution was to begin projecting strength and hard power,
that is to become more masculine (Drew 2004). There was no mistake in the way
the Bush administration chose to characterize the United States. The mixture of
feminine and masculine language to create the image of the United States military
as the knight in shining armor swooping in on a white horse to save the damsel in
distress—which became U.S. citizens, Western ideals of democracy and freedom,
and women and children in the Middle East wrapped up in one—helped to
legitimize the War on Terror.
George W. Bush was certainly not the first president to promote the idea
of a masculine America. The rhetoric surrounding American foreign policy has
always taken on a tone of dominance and aggression (Dean 1998; Enloe 2005).
The conversation about American foreign policy and gender is much deeper than
just the rhetoric used by politicians and journalists on TV and in the newspapers,
because foreign policy becomes more than intangible language. Historically,
policies of aggression involving military force have been, and continue to be,
perceived as more viable options than those of diplomacy involving negotiations
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(Cohn 1993). The concepts of hegemonic masculinity and mutual exclusivity
discussed previously allow us to draw important conclusions about why
aggressive policies are more legitimate than peaceful ones. Dominant males who
personify the ideals of the true “manly man” are the people who have controlled
American foreign policy since it existed, and the few women who have cracked
into this glass encased field, such as Condoleezza Rice, Madeleine Albright, and
Hillary Clinton, have been attributed many of the qualities identified as
masculine.
In his 1998 article titled “Masculinity as Ideology: John F. Kennedy and
the Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy,” author Robert Dean stated, “Internalized
ideals of manliness influenced the way leaders perceived threats posed by foreign
powers. Fear of the consequences of being judged “unmanly” influenced the
reckoning of political costs or benefits associated with possible responses to those
threats.” The relative success of the United States is often credited to our style of
foreign policy, and because that foreign policy has traditionally been saturated
with a masculine dogma, any policies associated with soft power and femininity
are delegitimized (Goldstein 2003; Tickner 1992; Cohn 1993).
This inherent delegitimization of soft power policy solutions limits the
scope with which American foreign policy can respond to the multitude of
challenges that face our political leaders on a daily basis. Shortly following World
War II, Albert Einstein notoriously stated, “You cannot simultaneously prevent
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and prepare for war.” What Einstein was alluding to was the concept of nuclear
deterrence and the building up of arsenals of biological and nuclear weapons.
Einstein’s statement characterizes what I argue throughout this thesis, whereas,
more generally, he was alluding to the threat of force—which is the use of hard
power—in order to prevent another war. There exists a dichotomy between soft
and hard power—one cannot exist in the same instance as another; and
furthermore, because hard power has historically been accepted as the most
logical way to respond to foreign adversaries—clearly Einstein’s warning meant
little to both the United States and Russia—soft power policy solutions are
systematically overlooked as even potential choices. In some ways there was
actually hypocrisy among the feminized rhetoric used to describe the Iran Deal; it
was cast as both “dangerous” and “ineffective.” Regardless, those who opposed
the deal were baffled that it was even being considered as a viable solution in the
first place, and that mindset exists because of the reality of illegitimacy that soft
power lives in.
Research Design & Methodology
As the previous sections alluded to, themes of masculinity and femininity
are pervasive in American foreign policy. We can see them in the existence of
particular stories that are told about what policies are viable, and the language
used to critique these policies. In “W” Stands for Women, author Michaele L.
Ferguson (2007, 13) states, “Rhetoric is never merely rhetoric, it constructs a
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particular (if incomplete) world view that enables us to see certain connections,
yet occludes others. Like a picture frame, the rhetorical framing of political issues
shapes and contextualizes the perspective of the audience.” Perception is reality,
and rhetoric is undeniably used to influence the way that abstract concepts such as
foreign policy become reified. Discourse, as it is essentially the action of nuanced
communication, is constantly changing. Thus, the importance of tracking
discourse over time is unquestionable.
This thesis has two main components: the empirical and the theoretical.
The empirical evidence—found through a discourse analysis of the Iran Deal,
discussed below, and a contextual discussion of masculinity, femininity, and the
relationship between gender and American foreign policy—is used to shape the
theoretical discussion of the legitimacy granted to the Iran Deal. It is important to
note that this style of research intrinsically links the research completed to the
researcher. Discourse analysis is a unique style of research in that it is based on
observation and theory building, both of which are subjective and interpretative in
nature. This study in particular is loosely influenced by Roxanne Doty’s 1993
discourse analysis of the U.S.’ counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines.
Doty (1993) uses what she calls the “Discursive Practices Approach,” to
study the “linguistic composition of reality” in regards to U.S.-Philippines policy.
I use this approach because I am interested in uncovering the underlying
meanings and implications of the discourses on a particular American foreign
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policy. While Doty (1993) also points out the connection between the researcher
and the research due to the interpretative nature, she explains the validity and
reliability well. Doty (1993) analyzes rhetoric by looking for distinctions in the
presupposition, predication, and subject positioning of the subjects and objects
related to her topic of choice. At its most fundamental level, discourse analysis is
about identifying a subject, examining the language used to describe and discuss
that subject, and then explaining the meaning given to that subject through its
description. Meaningful discourse in and of itself is not always easily identified,
and discourse analysis in practice can be ambiguous because of the multitude of
meanings one type of discourse can take on at any point in time. Discourse
analysis allows us to identify the ways in which our language is built upon a
system of hierarchies and preconceived notions that impact our understanding of
any given topic. Through my discourse analysis of the Iran Deal I seek to
investigate the identity created for this specific soft power foreign policy solution
through the rhetoric used to discuss the agreement. In my conclusion, I use the
competing gendered characterizations of the Iran deal by critics and supporters to
argue that this structure of language impacts the way that the Iran deal, and other
soft power solutions thereafter, is perceived and thought about. I argue that the
different language used to discuss the Iran deal is not simply arbitrary, but
actually constructs multiple realties within which the Iran deal exists depending
on the type of language that is used.
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The main reason that Doty’s 1993 discourse analysis in particular
influenced this research is because she emphasizes that the empirical analysis of
rhetoric is not interpreted subjectively by the researcher. The interpretive nature
of her discourse analysis lies in how she explains what the existence of that
rhetoric means. This aspect in particular is what separates a discourse analysis
from a content analysis. Like Roxanne Doty, this research does not merely state
the existence of certain content. Instead, this research pushes one step further.
Through my interpretation, I theorize what the implications are of the existence of
feminine and masculine language in the rhetoric used by those discussing the Iran
Deal, and how that language codified the Iran Deal depending on which way a
speaker gendered the agreement. Specifically, I discuss how the rhetoric
surrounding the Iran Deal shaped the understanding of the legitimacy of the deal
as an action of foreign policy.
The discourse analysis portion of this research is based on articles from
The New York Times and The Washington Post from January through December
of 2015. This range of dates was chosen for two reasons. First, there were several
major developments regarding the Iran Deal made throughout the year of 2015.
Second, the Google Trends data shows that the largest spikes in searches for the
Iran Deal all happened between March 24, 2015 and September 12, 2015. The
initial spike correlates with the announcement of a letter sent by Republican
lawmakers in Congress to political leaders in Iran threatening the likelihood of the
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deal’s failure without U.S. congressional support which President Obama
slammed as unconstitutional (Davenport 2018). This range of trends also includes
the official announcement of an agreed upon deal, the support of the deal through
a UN resolution, and the sending of this deal to Congress by President Obama
(Davenport 2018). This trend data led me to believe that not only was the policy
more prominent in media publications at this time, but also that more people were
coming into contact with the rhetoric being used to discuss it. Thus, because I
seek to argue that gendered discourse constructed the reality in which the Iran
deal was perceived by those who participated in and bought into such discourse, I
decided that the year of 2015 would be the most effective year from which to
draw my empirical evidence.
In any situation of foreign policy, the main creators of the discourse being
used are the politicians implementing or arguing against a policy, and the
journalists commentating on their process. In this media analysis, I chose to use
articles from The New York Times and The Washington Post because both
publications are prominent political watchdogs of the United States government
with significant reader bases, and neither is known for being substantially biased
towards either end of the political spectrum (Glader 2017). I chose which articles
specifically to analyze through a random sample. I found through the LexisNexis
database that there were 467 total articles in The New York Times and The
Washington Post—258 from the Times and 218 from the Post—that mentioned the
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Iran Deal from January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015. I inputted this range of
numbers (1-467) into Excel to rearrange them into a randomized list, and then
analyzed the articles in the order generated by Excel. I did not have a specific
number of articles that I expected to read, but rather I decided I would continue
reading articles until I felt like I wasn’t receiving any new empirical evidence
from my analysis.
Keeping in mind the Discursive Practices Approach outlined by Roxanne
Doty (1993), I evaluated each article for descriptive language that painted the Iran
Deal as either masculine or feminine. Because we know that both explicit and
implicit rhetoric have an effect on the reality that language creates, I categorized
my observations in these two separate categories. I used the descriptors that were
repeated most commonly when discussing the Iran deal to structure my discussion
of the reality this rhetoric creates. These are words used by politicians—domestic
and international, as well as authors from The New York Times and The
Washington Post. Notably, most of the people present in the discussions of the
Iran Deal are men. Though the use of feminine and masculine rhetoric is not
dependent upon the maleness or femaleness of the person speaking, it is
interesting that the most prominent actors and commentators of the Deal were
men. The Iran deal specifically was chosen because this policy solution
encompassed multilateral negotiations and diplomacy—two of the main signifiers
of soft power. The deal was also heavily debated and I expected there to be an
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effort from those who did not support it to characterize the policy in an
unfavorable light. In addition, the Iran Deal—as opposed to other issues I
considered, such as responses to the Syrian Refugee crisis and the debate
regarding the competition for funding between the State Department and the
Department of Defense—has transcended academic and humanitarian discourse;
the agreement has steadily been apart of household public discourse as well.
Throughout the recent presidential election, a candidate’s position on the Iran deal
was a frequent topic, whereas the Syrian Refugee crisis and the funding debate
were less common. I thought that it was important to choose a debate that was
prominent in both the professional and public aspects of foreign policy because of
the emphasis I place on the ability rhetoric has to impact widespread perception.
The descriptors observed were used in all different aspects of the Iran
Deal. They were present in discussions regarding the writing of the policy, the
development of negotiations, the implementation process, and the potential
outcomes of the proposed policy. Additionally, this rhetoric was also used
concerning the individuals involved in the establishment of the policy, namely
members of the Obama administration. In the case that a descriptor was only used
to describe President Obama himself or his administration, but was not used to
describe the Iran Deal, it has been italicized in the tables below.
Findings
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As previously stated, this section of my analysis is grounded in empirical
evidence. I observed the language used to discuss the Iran Deal by identifying
adjectives, adverbs, and characteristics prescribed to the deal. The methodology
with which I studied each article is similar to the “predication” methodology of
Roxanne Doty (1993). The articles used in this media analysis are listed in the
Appendix in the order by which I analyzed them.
There are two existing tables that organize my findings; the information in
these tables is categorized in three different ways. Table 1 organizes the explicit
language used, while Table 2 organizes the implicit language. Then, these
descriptors are categorized as either for or against and as either feminine or
masculine. By for or against I do not simply mean whether the language was
positive or negative, but rather whether the owner of the language was supportive
or unsupportive of the Iran Deal. This style of presentation was chosen so as to
best juxtapose the sheer amount of masculine rhetoric used in the discourse
supporting foreign policy in comparison to the amount of feminine rhetoric used
by those who oppose the policy. These differences seem to be particularly stark
when the prevailing discourse is effectively a debate about whether or not a
certain policy should be implemented.
The explicit language, presented in Table 1, is not surprising. These
descriptors were taken from phrases such as, “an imperfect deal,” “a smarter,
more responsible way to protect,” “strong and disciplined diplomacy,”
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“vulnerabilities of the deal,” and “worrisome implications.” These are direct
phrases that politicians used when discussing the Iran Deal in public settings
(such as on the House and Senate floors, in press conferences, and in television
interviews) or were stated directly to journalists, and were then reported in one of
the two media outlets. In some cases, such as with the phrase “Iran…[is] rubbing
Obama’s face in the weakness of his enforcement position,” (emphasis my own)
the language is used not by a politician, but instead directly by the author of the
article. As can be seen, there is a significant difference in the type of language
that those who supported the Iran Deal chose to use in comparison to the type of
language used by those who did not support the agreement.
Table 1: Explicit Descriptors
Feminine

Masculine

	
  

For
Imperfect (3)
Multilateral (2)
Passionate (2)

Against
Vulnerable (2)
Worrisome (1)
[A] burden (1)
Humiliating (1)
Dependent [on
compliance] (3)
Dependent [on Iranians]
(2)
Imperfect (1)
Dangerous (4)
[A] misjudgment (1)
Complex (1)
Soft (1)
Weak (1)

Smart (1)
Strong (2)
Responsible (1)
Disciplined (1)
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Valuable (1)
Promises possibility (1)
Appropriate (1)
Fair (1)
Comprehensive (1)
[Exemplifies] leadership (2)
This difference can also be seen in the implicit language, presented in
Table 2, that was used. These descriptors were taken from phrases such as, “to
signal readiness and restore a credible military option,” “providing a pyromaniac
with matches,” “does not inspire confidence,” “instead of chest-beating,” “better
than nothing,” “spur a nuclear arms race,” “increases the chances of war,”
“disloyal to the U.S.,” and “will sustain the military options in case it becomes
necessary.”
Table 2: Implicit Descriptors
Feminine

Masculine

	
  

For
Mediocre (5)

Civilized (1)
Loyal (1)
Patriotic (4)
Adequate (3)
Reasonable (6)
Broad (2)
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Against
Dependent [on military backup]
(6)
Powerless (5)
Submissive (6)
Passive (3)
Volatile (6)
Unpreparedness (2)
Illegitimate (2)
Flawed (4)
[Inspires feelings of] doubt, fear,
hesitation (13)

Far-reaching (2)

The rhetoric listed in these tables has also been elementarily quantified.
The parenthetical numbers next to each descriptor signify the number of times
that descriptor appeared in the discourse analysis process. Initially, I was
concerned that the limited number of explicit descriptors found would be limiting
in my research. Because this is a random sample taken, it can be inferred that
similar descriptors would be found throughout the articles that were not analyzed.
Additionally, a significant amount of the descriptors come quotes of different
speakers, and many of the explicit descriptors illicit similar connotations and
implications. For instance, “vulnerable” and “worrisome,” though not the same
word, bring forward similar feelings of inferiority and uncertainty. This shows
that, though many of the explicit descriptors were only found once throughout the
analysis, there was a widespread use of feminine language by critics and
masculine language by supporters.
These numbers show an interesting disparity in the commonality of
implicit and explicit language. In the discourse analysis, much of the explicit
descriptors were seen only once or twice, while many of the implicit descriptors
were seen more often. Though this is not relevant to the discussion of masculinity
and femininity in foreign policy, this observation draws interesting questions
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about the way that politicians discuss policies when addressing the public.
Additionally, Table 1 and Table 2 show a notable difference in the amount of
masculine and feminine language used depending on whether the person speaking
was a supporter or not. Supporters of the Iran deal used a very minimal amount of
feminine language when discussing why they were supporting the agreement;
while those who did not support the Iran deal only used feminine language. No
masculine language was explicitly used to show disagreement with the deal, and
in general we wouldn’t expect to hear someone—neither a supporter nor
dissenter—say that any action of foreign policy should be considered “too strong”
or “too powerful.” This observation is supported by the previous discussion of
foreign policy being generally characterized in a masculine manner. Because the
default characteristics within foreign policy are masculine, it stands to reason that
masculine language is used as long as the policy is supported, and that feminine
language is only used to argue against a policy.
My main goal in completing this research is to answer one question: Are
specific policy solutions—for example, the Iran Deal—characterized as feminine
or masculine? Due to the existing research that shows that foreign policy is almost
entirely discussed through a masculine lens, I presupposed that the answer to my
question would be that a soft power solution such as the Iran Deal would be
characterized as feminine. Tables 1 and 2 provide evidence of my own that this is
true. There is an overwhelming amount of feminine language used by those who

	
  

34

opposed the Iran Deal—as stated previously, these individuals did not use any
masculine language to argue against the Iran Deal.
The findings of this discourse analysis also show that masculine language
was used in direct opposition to feminine language. The tables provide further
evidence that the rhetoric used in the discourse of foreign policy is gendered.
Based on the observation that those who did not support the Iran deal used
exclusively feminine language to describe it, and that the supporters of the Iran
deal used almost entirely masculine language leads to the conclusion that
masculine qualities are fundamentally more valuable in this realm of policy than
feminine language. Supporters of the Iran Deal specifically chose to leave out
descriptors such as “peaceful,” or “compromising,” or “nonviolent” because, even
though the agreement was all of those things, these are not characteristics that
make policymakers, journalists, or the public feel confident in a policy. Instead
supporters focused solely on the typical rhetoric of foreign policy used to describe
hard power policy solutions like “strength” and “security.” Even when President
Obama praised the agreement for not being a symbol of “chest-beating,” he paired
this phrase with words like “smart” and “responsible,” so that instead of this
seeming like a criticism of masculinity, it became a criticism of barbarism; he
painted a picture of the conqueror versus the conquered, a civilized, strategic
diplomat versus an unintelligent caveman. Even in criticizing toxic masculinity,
President Obama still managed to portray an image of a more advanced,
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sophisticated type of masculinity—one that still very much held the power and
control in the U.S.-Iran relationship.
Though there are many interesting items of discussion regarding the
language I observed to be the most commonly used to describe the Iran Deal,
there are three items which I believe are most important when considering the
descriptive rhetoric surrounding it. The emphasis placed on the deal’s dependent
nature, the implication of mere mediocrity, and the use of masculine rhetoric by
the supporters of the deal are the three predominant themes that I identified.
Emphasis on Dependence
One of the most common themes in the language used by the opposition
was that of dependence. Explicitly and implicitly, those opposed to the Iran Deal
claimed that it was dependent on Iran, dependent on compliance, and dependent
on military backup. The supporters of the Iran deal also reinforced the deal as a
multilateral operation, which has interesting connotations in and of itself. The
idea of dependence alone brings with it ideas of weakness, naïveté, and inability.
There are separate meanings between the Iran Deal being dependent on
Iran and being dependent on Iran’s compliance. At the very least, there are
separate connotations. In an article written for the Washington Post, journalist
Dennis Ross (Appendix A, Item 24) said that the success of the Iran Deal
“depends heavily on Iranians allowing access to inspect sites.” The identification
of another state becoming dominant over the United States is incredibly
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detrimental to the image of a foreign policy solution among policymakers. This
specification of the Iran Deal being dependent on not just something outside of
the written agreement itself, but on another foreign entity, i.e. Iran, in particular
signifies a complete lack of control owned by the United States. As discussed
previously, the United States places an incredible amount of effort into being the
most dominant, and therefore the most masculine, state in any foreign
relationship. Dominance evokes other descriptive words such as assertive,
effective, powerful, and, above all, complete control of the situation; all things
that are the opposite of dependence. Dominance is a key aspect of idealized
masculinity as it directly includes being aggressive and risk-taking, and striving
for power and success (Pacholok 2009).
Dependence on compliance, though it essentially has the same meaning
when taken out of context, has a slightly different undertone. Senator Rand Paul
said that the deal is “dependent on compliance,” suggesting that the deal is only
legitimate if it works. In order to see how this implication relates to the ideas of
masculinity and femininity we will have to dig a little deeper. Recall earlier in this
paper when I discussed the relationship between femininity and femaleness.
Though femininity and femaleness are not directly correlated, the language of
femininity is often assumed to apply to women, and, vice versa, the characteristics
and experiences of women are assumed to be distinctly feminine. Particularly in
the field of foreign policy, women, if allowed a chance, are then expected to
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prove themselves. They are only accepted as viable players once they prove that
their policies work. Men, on the other hand, are assumed to be innately good at
navigating the realm of international relations. When Senator Rand Paul stated
that the Iran Deal was “dependent on compliance,” he was implying that the deal
would have to prove its worth, that time would tell whether or not the agreement
was viable—in the same way a woman would have to as the Secretary of State.
What’s most interesting about this is not that it is fundamentally wrong to want a
policy or a person to prove their worth through their outcomes, but rather that
only feminine entities—be it policies or people—are expected to. Masculine
entities, however, have failed time and time again. Aggressive actions do not
always fix the problems they set out to fix, often they even make them worse, and
masculine leaders, because they are human, have made countless numbers of
mistakes. Still, these masculine units are assumed to be the most natural and
effective options.
The reinforcement of the Iran deal as a multilateral operation has a similar
effect in terms of drawing themes of femininity. The idea of being multilateral in
and of itself is not a bad thing—it means the U.S. was following international
protocol and respecting other states with interests in the region. Multilateral
operations can also be considered a form of protection from retaliation of
aggrieved states (Ikenberry 2003). Still, there is an underlying implication of
dependence on other nations that follows multilateralism. It also brings with it
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connotations of compromise and shared power and leadership responsibility.
These are all concepts that fall under the category of feminized rhetoric, and serve
to place multilateralism into this category as well. The idea of a policy being
managed by the United States as dependent on the buy in and political authority
of other states and entities such as the European Union and United Nations served
to secure the soft policy solution of the Iran deal as an inherently feminine action.
The emphasis placed upon dependence on military action is perhaps the
most obviously feminine rhetoric available within the larger theme of dependence
in general. General Martin E. Dempsey, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff at the time of the implementation of the Iran Deal, said that the agreement
[was] “better than launching a military strike, but I will sustain the military
options in case it becomes necessary.” President Obama attempted to mollify
concerns about the deal by assuring that Israel would always have military
superiority over their neighbors. Senator Marco Rubio called for the United States
to instead gain a stable military position in the Middle East “to signal readiness
and restore a credible military option.” The King of Saudi Arabia was unhappy
with the United State’s approach to Iran, and negotiated a $1 billion arms
agreement with the Pentagon to provide weapons for the Saudi Arabian war effort
and bolster Saudi forces in order to reassure those with concerns about the
shortcomings of the Iran Deal. Saudi Arabia was noted as becoming “increasingly
assertive,” signifying that states who choose to use weapons are assertive, while
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those who choose not to use weapons are the opposite: passive, meek, compliant.
The previous discussion of hegemonic masculinity, idealized masculinity, and
military masculinity all being relatively synonymous make the relationship
between the rhetoric of dependence on the military and lack of masculinity quite
palpable. The assertion that the Iran Deal would not be sufficient on its own
accord from both the support and the dissent implies that the deal is feminine in
nature, and is a strong indication that this form of foreign policy is not seen as
entirely legitimate because of that implication.
“Weakness is always considered a danger when issues of national security
are at stake,” states Tickner (1992, emphasis my own). The frequent portrayal of
the Iran Deal as dependent in any form did more than just link the deal to ideas of
weakness because it was also consistently paired with phrases that codified the
deal as dangerous. This is significant because it further allowed the option of
using military force to seem like the safe alternative, even though the use of
military troops puts the livelihood of American soldiers in direct risk. Classifying
the Iran Deal as a dangerous, unstable, or volatile policy solution that could only
be made credible through the use of a hard power solution created a dichotomy in
which the feminized Iran Deal existed in direct opposition to the masculinized
military. This hierarchy inherently places hard power solutions above soft power
solutions, and therefore allowed the Iran Deal to be depicted as a less legitimate
response than the use of military force.
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Implication of Mediocrity & Lack of Confidence
Even though they are considered synonyms, there is a slight difference
between the words “adequate” and “mediocre,” and that difference leaves one
characterized as masculine and the other as feminine. When we decide something
is adequate, we think of phrases such as, “This will work.” When something is
defined as mediocre, however, the phrase that comes to mind is, “We can find
something better.” Adjectives such as “imperfect” and “flawed” were used both
by those who supported and those who did not support the deal, but the tone with
which they were used is what signaled a difference between adequacy and
mediocrity. Both supporters, Senator Blumenthal said that the agreement was
“imperfect, [but] the best path forward,” and Senator Peters said that the deal “fell
short [but that] …alternatives [were] more dangerous.” Over 100 former
American ambassadors came together to defend the agreement, saying that it was
“comprehensive and rigorously negotiated,” and that though it was “not a perfect
or risk-free settlement…without it the risks would be far greater.” Both of these
statements imply that the deal itself would do, it wasn’t perfect, but it was
acceptable.
Mediocrity more so than adequacy was implied across the aisle. There was
significant emphasis placed on the “doubts,” “fears,” and “skepticism”
surrounding the deal. President Obama and his administration pushed the
agreement as an ultimatum. He said, “No deal means a greater chance of more
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war in the Middle East,” and that the choice being made was “between diplomacy
and some sort of war.” The opposition used similar language to that used by the
supporters when saying that the deal was imperfect and flawed, but then followed
up by saying that they were in favor of “tougher” and “more ironclad” deals—
specifically deals that included the use of the United States military. President
Obama’s language made the Iran Deal something that was standing directly in the
middle of stability and chaos. The ultimatum he gave policymakers signified that
it didn’t matter if there was a better deal to be had, this was the one that had been
negotiated and it was the one they would be moving forward with. The language
he used was the equivalent of a parent giving in to their toddler whining about
how something “just isn’t fair.” In this metaphor, Obama-as-parent says to
Congress-as-whining-toddler, “You’re right, it isn’t fair, but you’re just going to
have to deal with it.” Adequacy is something we seek, while mediocrity is
something we seek to overcome.
Similar to the discussion of the emphasis placed on the agreement’s
dependence on compliance, the rhetoric of adequacy and mediocrity is gendered
through our understanding of how femininity and masculinity relate to femaleness
and maleness. Women are consistently held to different workplace standards than
men, and it is well documented that women receive less workplace promotions
than men. Often this is attributed to women’s personalities; hypocritical standards
exist for women in positions of superiority in which they cannot be too strong or
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too soft or too mean or too nice or too loud or too quiet or too or too or too. When
it comes time for promotions, men are almost always assumed to be adequate for
the position, and if they are excellent candidates that is just an extra bonus.
Women, on the other hand, are presumed to have certain personality qualities that
they have to overcome, evoking a sense of mediocrity and less confidence,
meaning that women often have to prove not only adequacy but true excellence in
order to be chosen for a promotion. Similarly, those opposed to the Iran Deal
emphasized a sense of mediocrity at best—signifying that there absolutely was
something better out there, specifically something more closely aligned with a
hard power solution.
Use of Masculine Language by Supporters
Those who supported the Iran deal almost exclusively used masculine
rhetoric when discussing the agreement in public settings. Phrases such as
“increase of regional security,” “America will be safer and stronger,” and “strong
and disciplined diplomacy,” were common. Some supporters stated that those
who chose not to support the agreement were “treasonous” and “disloyal to the
U.S.,” implying that support for the deal was patriotic and loyal—both masculine
terms. Though this theme in the rhetoric is not directly related to the use of
feminine language, I think that the implications are just as strong. In order to
attempt to legitimize and increase support for a diplomacy deal, a type of soft
power associated with femininity, supporters were careful to use the same type of
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language that would be used to discuss military action. They assured those who
were uncertain about the deal that the Iran Deal negotiations would bring strength,
stability, and security.
The rhetoric with which supporters framed the Iran Deal is significant
because it is purposefully lacking of language that included words such as
“peace,” “compromise,” and “nonviolent.” Though peace and the absence of
violence are typically the goal of any foreign policy—wars are waged in the name
of stopping violent injustice—the use of these words were not used because
supporters knew that they would not create the reality that those with concerns
wanted to hear. The Obama Administration’s Iran deal was fighting an uphill
battle, and policymakers across the aisle wanted to know what the benefits of this
deal would truly be. Even the type of masculine rhetoric President Obama
employed was strategic. In order to make the Iran Deal agreement seem like the
most viable option available, he simultaneously condemned brute force and
lauded a sophisticated, civilized function of power. Obama was quoting as saying
that instead of “chest-beating,” it should be accepted that “strong and disciplined
diplomacy is the best way.” There was a conscious effort here to reinforce that
this policy would still result in the United States’ strength and power over another
state entity.
Conclusion
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The observations I have made lead me to more nuanced findings than I
originally expected to arrive upon. I did expect to find the discussion of the Iran
deal to be largely characterized as feminine in nature. However, the
overwhelming use of masculine language by supporters of the Iran deal was not
something I expected to observe in this context. At the outset, I believed that I
would see two different types of feminine language being used; supporters using
positive feminine language such as “compromise,” and dissenters using language
similar to what was seen—negative ideas such as “vulnerable.” The dichotomy
that exists between the use of feminine and masculine language—feminine
language to express a negative view and masculine language used to express a
positive view—has incredible implications on what the use of feminine language
does to any form of foreign policy. Previous research on masculinity and
femininity shows us that masculine characteristics are inherently more valued in
our society, and as such the feminine characterization of the Iran deal served to
render it less legitimate than a more masculine policy. The empirical evidence of
this study allows us to infer that feminine rhetoric is used to characterize policy
solutions as an illegitimate act of foreign policy. Though I originally expected to
be able to draw this conclusion in relevance to only soft power solutions, I
wonder if this is truly the case. There should be further research done on the
gendered rhetoric surrounding foreign policy solutions. The findings of this
research raise an important question about whether or not feminine rhetoric is
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used to negate any action of foreign policy as a viable option. Furthermore, is
masculine language used intentionally to make feminized policy solutions seem
more legitimate and effective?
This research is not without limitations. First, it is entirely possible that
my sole analysis of newspaper articles contributed to the type of rhetoric that I
found discussing the Iran deal. By limiting my analysis to exclude television news
media, I may have also neglected rhetoric that was actually intended to reach a
wider public audience. As television news media is typically more politically
biased than print news, it would be interesting to extend this analysis to
discussions of the Iran deal within television news media to see if there is a
difference in the type of rhetoric used to characterize the agreement. The use of
only print news media may have also contributed to the lack of explicit
descriptors found. In each article, there was often only one quote that could be
considered as intending to characterize the Iran deal. In many of the articles,
unless they were opinion based pieces, journalists refrained from making any of
their own comments about the intrinsic nature of the deal. This lack of biased
descriptive language from journalists meant that most of the rhetoric was coming
from politicians, and only searching for this rhetoric in print news media limited
the volume available for analysis.
The difference between print news media and television news media
implicates a different audience as well. Television news media is directed more
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towards the general public looking to receive as much news as possible as quickly
as possible. Print news media is typically more detailed and discusses current
events in a much more educational manner. The rhetoric used in television news
media is specifically directed towards an uninformed public, while print news
media takes quotes from direct interviews, written statements, political hearings,
or premeditated public addresses. The audience of print news media is a more
informed public are often taken from a situation directly related to the policy
being discussed, which means that the rhetoric being used seeks to delegitimize a
policy solution for a completely different audience. In the case of this analysis,
the rhetoric sought to delegitimize the Iran deal for political actors on the other
side of the aisle from the speaker. The language found here shows supporters
seeking to change the minds of dissenters and vice versa. If further research was
to be done regarding the rhetoric used in television news media, the audience
would shift and so would the rhetoric.
Furthermore, the Iran deal was an incredibly politicized agreement, and
thus the discussion largely tended to be black and white. Though supporters of the
deal accepted and stated that the agreement had its flaws, they stayed consistent in
their use of language that characterized the deal as the most reasonable option. On
the contrary, those who did not support the deal did not waiver from their
characterization of the deal as a dangerous policy that would not do what it was
intended to do. Furthermore, the time frame with which I analyzed the rhetoric of
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the Iran deal was in the middle of an extremely politicized relationship between
Republicans and Democrats, and between Congress and the Executive branch. I
believe it is possible that the extreme politicization of the deal led to the polarized
nature of the rhetoric that surrounded this debate. Similar research should be done
to analyze the rhetoric of soft power policy solutions that are not so politicized to
find if there is a similar pattern in the use of feminine and masculine rhetoric.
In the case of the Iran deal, feminine language was used by those who did
not agree with the policy as a worthwhile solution, while masculine language was
used by those who did. In order to prove that this characterization had an impact
on the perception of the Iran deal as legitimate or illegitimate, more research
would need to be done in regards to public perception of the specific descriptors
used to discuss the policy. It would also be interesting to apply this theory to other
instances of soft power policy solutions. One such policy debate that would
produce interesting detail to this discussion is the War on Terror. There has been a
major emphasis throughout multiple presidential administrations that the United
States government does not and will not ever negotiate with terrorists, but we
consistently interact with state entities that have committed atrocities against their
citizens more horrific than the average terrorist attack. While the approach to
terrorism is riddled with grey areas, it is interesting to consider how our
preconceived notions and innate acceptance of hard power policy solutions may
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inhibit us from considering how any sort of soft power solution may be better
suited to reaching the goals of the War on Terror.
Currently, there is a noteworthy discussion happening regarding the
United States approach to our relationship with North Korea. The Trump
administration has maintained simultaneous uses of hard and soft power in
response to North Korea; threatening military attacks while also verbally
supporting the existence of a diplomatic relationship between President Trump
and Kim Jong Un. A discourse analysis of President Trump’s proposed policy
solutions in general would surely yield interesting insights, but this policy in
particular has been a highlight of his since he began his presidential campaign.
President Trump has relied on the use of masculine imagery of dominance from
the very beginning, so I believe we would find similar findings in that the rhetoric
surrounding a diplomatic relationship with North Korea would probably be
characterized by masculine terms. Furthermore, it would be interesting to analyze
the way in which Republicans and Democrats have changed their rhetorical
framing of the debate between the use of hard or soft power policy solutions from
the Obama administration to the Trump administration.
The implications of these findings are far-reaching within the field of
foreign policy, and beg much larger questions. If soft power solutions are
delegitimized through feminine rhetoric what does this mean for individuals who
are not perceived to own the characteristics of hegemonic masculinity, such as
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women and heterosexual men, seeking positions in foreign policy? Liberals and
typically Democrats, are more likely to be proponents of soft power solutions than
of hard power solutions, what does the delegitimization of soft power solutions do
to the credibility of Democrats in the field of foreign policy? To what extent does
the public’s perception of the value implicit to masculinity and femininity shape
the discourse within which policy solutions are discussed? How important is it
that soft power policy solutions are at the very least perceived as legitimate in
order for them to be effective? Is there any truth to the characterization of soft
power policy solutions as less legitimate than hard power policy solutions?
Perhaps the most important question that this research begs is one of change.
How, with such an intrinsic relationship to masculinity, can the field of foreign
policy separate itself from the gendered bias it is currently steeped in?
Furthermore, do we actually want this bias to change?
As stated previously throughout this research, rhetoric is incredibly
important. It creates the reality that we exist within, and dictates how we perceive
everything around us. The findings of this research have important implications
on the perception of femininity on a greater scale within American society. We
place a significant amount of responsibility and status on the state, and thus the
state’s affairs. If the actions of the state continue to be inherently biased against
femininity, then progress to correct the value disparity between masculinity and
femininity will eventually plateau. Furthermore, as our social construction of
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masculinity and femininity causes us to prescribe the characteristics of each to
men and women respectively, then this biased rhetoric will only continue to
uphold the notion that women are inferior to men in the realm of public matters,
including the field of American foreign policy.
The gendered bias that exists within American foreign policy is hindering
our ability to curate flexible, multifaceted policies that are easily personalized to
different solutions. I hope that as more women begin to enter the field of foreign
policy, feminine qualities such as empathy, the propensity to listen, and
compassion begin to be more valued in our policymaking strategies. That being
said, the women who have progressed the closest to surpassing the ultimate glass
ceiling in American foreign policy have all been somewhat hawkish in their
foreign policy, which further goes to show that femininity and femaleness are not
truly synonymous. Ultimately, regardless of gender, foreign policy actors have to
be more cognizant of their preconceived notions of legitimate foreign policy
solutions and have to start asking themselves why those preconceived notions
exist in the first place. It will take the self-awareness of all those involved in the
discourse of foreign policy to recognize how their gender biased language affects
the perceptions of the public on subjects beyond those of foreign policy.
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Appendix:
Articles Observed in Discourse Analysis (listed in order of observation)
1.   Rudoren, Jodi. 2015. “Netanyahu Appoints Right-Wing Politician as
Israeli Ambassador to U.N.” The New York Times
2.   Gladstone, Rick and Jodi Rudoren. 2015. “Benjamin Netanyahu, at U.N.,
Continues to Condemn Iran Nuclear Deal.” The New York Times
3.   Erdbrink, Thomas. 2015. “Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Urges ‘Careful
Scrutiny’ of Iran Deal.” The New York Times
4.   Shear, Michael D. 2015. “Jonathan Pollard, Spy for Israel, to Be Released
on Parole.” The New York Times
5.   Harris, Gardiner. 2015. “Obama’s Quiet Vacation Will Yield to a Noisy
September.” The New York Times
6.   Mackey, Robert. 2015. “Complete Video of Obama’s Case for the Iran
Deal.” The New York Times
7.   Birnbaum, Michael and Carol Morello. 2015. “No breakthroughs as Kerry,
Putin meet in Sochi.” The Washington Post
8.   Roth, Andrew. 2015. “Russian official denies reports of Iranian general’s
secret visit.” The Washington Post
9.   Weiner, Rachel. 2015. “Democratic Sen. Ben Cardin says he will vote
against the Iran deal.” The Washington Post
10.  No Byline. 2015. “The Iran deal’s credibility.” The Washington Post
11.  Shear, Michael D. 2015. “In Speech to Veterans, Obama Says Iran Deal Is
‘Smarter’ Path to Take.” The New York Times
12.  Weisman, Jonathan and Alesander Burns. 2015. “Iran Deal Opens a
Vitriolic Divide Among American Jews.” The New York Times
13.  Davis, Julie Hirschfeld. 2015. “Former U.S. Diplomats Praise Iran Deal.”
The New York Times
14.  Kristof, Nicholas. 2015. “Mr. Obama, Try These Arguments for Your Iran
Deal.” The New York Times
15.  No Byline. 2015. “The Iran deal hurts U.S. allies.” The Washington Post
16.  DeBonis, Mike. 2015. “Obama may not need veto pen to save Iran deal.”
The Washington Post
17.  Kamen, Al and Colby Itkowitz. 2015. “The real winners in the Iran deal:
The lawyers.” The Washington Post
18.  Tumulty, Karen and Paul Kane. 2015. “Clinton making a sales pitch for
the agreement.” The Washington Post
19.  DeYong, Karen. 2015. “Joint Chiefs chairman offers ‘pragmatic’ nod to
Iran deal.” The Washington Post
20.  Rucker, Philip and Robert Costa. 2015. “Ohio senator tries to dodge
Trump’s shrapnel.” The Washington Post
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21.  Editorial Copy. 2015. “what are the Iran deal alternatives?” The
Washington Post
22.  Editorial Copy. 2015. “Too desperate for an Iran deal.” The Washington
Post
23.  Rudoren, Jodi. 2015. “Netanyahu May Turn Iran Defeat to His Favor.”
The New York Times
24.  Ross, Dennis. 2015. “Iran deal leaves U.S. with tough questions.” The
Washington Post
25.  Davis, Julie Hirschfeld. 2015. “White House Turns to Social Media to Sell
the Iran Deal.” The New York Times
26.  Morello, Carol. 2015. “Why this Sunday is a significant day for the Iran
nuclear deal.” The Washington Post
27.  Harris, Gardiner. 2015. “Biden Trip to Florida Raises Speculation About
Presidential Run.” The New York Times
28.  Bird, Kai. 2015. “The Ghosts That Haunt an Iran Accord.” The New York
Times.
29.  Davis, Julie Hirschfeld and Ashley Parker. 2015. “Ambassador Tries to
Bridge Gap with U.S., but on Israel’s Terms.” The New York Times
30.  Gerson, Michael. 2015. “Obama’s bitter endgame on Iran.” The
Washington Post
31.  Morello, Carol. 2015. “Key senator says to forget the deadline on Iran
talks for a better deal.” The Washington Post
32.  No Byline. 2015. “Today in Politics: A Pledge for Republican
Togetherness, on Donald Trump’s Terms.” The New York Times
33.  Davis, Julie Hirschfeld. 2015. “Pro-Israel Aipac Creates Group to Lobby
Against the Iran Deal.” The New York Times
34.  Dowd, Maureen. 2015. “Hi-Ho, Lone Ranger.” The New York Times
35.  No Byline. 2015. “Today in Politics: Jeb Bush Is Still Waiting for Polling
to Catch Up With Fund-Raising.” The New York Times
36.  The Editorial Board. 2015. “Israel and America After the Iran Deal.” The
New York Times
37.  No Byline. 2015. “Today in Politics: Democrats Gather for Chicken wings
in Shadow of Iowa State Fair.” The New York Times
38.  Weisman, Jonathan and Michael R. Gordon. 2015. “Kerry Defends Iran
Nuclear Deal Before Skeptical Senate.” The New York Times
39.  Brooks, David. 2015. “The Marco Rubio-Carly Fiorina Option.” The New
York Times
40.  Krguman, Paul. 2015. “R-E-S-P-E-C-T.” The New York Times
41.  Cooper, Helene and Gardiner Harris. 2015. “An Arms Deal is Aimed at
Saudis’ Iran Worries.” The New York Times
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42.  Parker, Ashley and Peter Baker. 2015. “G.O.P. Senator, Bob Corker, Is
Key Player in Iran Accord.” The New York Times
43.  Steinhauer, Jennifer and Julie Hirschfeld Davis. 2015. “Irate Democrats
Denounce G.O.P. on Iran Letter.” The New York Times
44.  Giacomo, Carol. 2015. “How to Get Smart About Iran.” The New York
Times
45.  Marcus, Ruth. 2015. “A break in Congress’s gridlock?” The Washington
Post
46.  Fifield, Anna. 2015. “N. Korea expanding its ability to mill uranium,
analyst says.” The Washington Post
47.  Johnson, Jenna and Robert Costa. 2015. “In Nev., Trump takes off the
heavy boxing gloves.” The Washington Post
48.  Eilperin, Juliet and Steven Mufson. 2015. “Obama calls congressional
oversight on Iran deal ‘reasonable’.” The Washington Post
49.  DeBonis, Mike and Katie Zezima. 2015. “At Capitol, a chorus against Iran
deal.” The Washington Post
50.  No Byline. 2015. “Sen. Cardin does not represent his constituents on
Iran.” The Washington Post
51.  No Byline. 2015. “Accord didn’t open door to nukes.” The Washington
Post
52.  Krauthammer, Charles. 2015. “The Iran deal: Anatomy of a disaster.” The
Washington Post
53.  Weigel, David. 2015. “At GOP debate, Paul seeks edge as a dove in sea of
hawks.” The Washington Post
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